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Citizenship and Religion in the Post-Yugoslav States 
 
Milja Radović, University of Edinburgh1 
 
Abstract 
In this paper I explore the ways in which religion and religious institutions impact 
citizenship regimes in the post-Yugoslav states, both explicitly and implicitly. I 
approach citizenship as membership and through the dimension of identity. The 
issue of identity, as I will show in this paper, has been at the core of the triadic nexus 
of political community, ethnic belonging and religious affiliation, which has had 
further impacts on the understanding of political membership, and the definitions of 
who belongs and how.   
 
Keywords: Religion, identity, membership, ethnocentrism, ethnophyletism 
 
 
1 Introduction  
 
In this paper I focus on the complex interaction between religion and citizenship 
regimes in the post-Yugoslav states. I approach citizenship as membership through the 
dimension of identity (as defined by Christian Joppke 2007). Joppke distinguishes 
between citizenship as status, rights, and identity; the latter “refers to the 
behavioural aspects of individuals acting and conceiving themselves as members of a 
collectivity, classically the nation.”2 The task of this paper is to identify the ways in 
which religion and religious institutions impact on citizenship regimes in the post-
Yugoslav states, if not explicitly upon their formal constitutional and legal 
definitions, then certainly implicitly upon the political practices shaped by the 
specific, ethnocentric understanding of political membership. 
I shall argue in this paper that at the heart of the triadic nexus of political 
community, ethnic belonging and religious affiliation, is the issue of identity that is 
pertinent for the concepts of membership and citizenship.   
Both membership in the religious community and membership in the political 
community in the former Yugoslav states, as I will show in this paper, have been 
intertwined with ethnic belonging. In the case of post-Yugoslav states, membership 
and identity do not “part ways”3 but on the contrary supplement each other. Even in 
the states that are recognized as multi-national or civic, ethnocentrism still prevails in 
the understandings of political membership of particular groups (to the exclusion of 
others). I argue that religion has had a crucial role in the conceptualization of the 
                                                 
1 Milja Radović, CITSEE Research Fellow, School of Law. Email: milja_r@yahoo.co.uk.   
2 Christian Joppke, “Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity”, Citizenship Studies, 11:1 
(2007), 37-48, 38. 
3 Joppke, “Transformation of Citizenship”, 38.  
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identities of post-Yugoslav political communities and has strongly influenced the 
understandings of political membership. Religion does not only impact on the ideas 
of membership but consequently also influences the understandings of status and 
rights.  
 
2 Religion, ethnicity and political communities  
 
Religion and citizenship focus on similar questions of membership and belonging. In 
the post-Yugoslav states, as in some other contexts, ethnonational identity preceded 
political/institutional/territorial polity. Belonging and membership in specific ethnic 
community has often been confirmed in the public space in two ways: politically and 
religiously, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but on the contrary they 
are frequently moulded by each other.  
Rogers Brubaker regards religion and nationalism as analogous phenomena4, 
connecting both to more general social structures and processes. As I will show 
below, in the Balkan states, religion and nationalism were often in conjunction with 
each other – processes such as politicization of culture5 through implementation of 
ethno-religious narratives led to very specific views and understandings of polity.  
The tension and interrelation between religious and political shows in the 
concepts of political membership: for instance, in the post-Yugoslav states, 
membership in a specific political community defined by ethnicity (that is often in 
majority within the entire community based on citizenship as legal status), has been 
often expressed through religious symbols that became embedded in state symbols.  
In the former Yugoslavia, the political revival of religion started in the mid-
1980s, concurrently with the prominence of nationalist ideologies at the moment 
when the question of national identity became one of the central political issues. 
Religion and religious institutions have been essential for structuring national 
identity. The Orthodox and Catholic Church came to be seen as a supreme moral, 
political and spiritual authority that defines both ethnos and demos.  
The Catholic Church in Croatia, or “the church of Croats”, became in the 1990s 
a strong element of Croatian nationalism. It portrayed its role as crucial in 
‘preserving national identity’ during socialist and supra-national Yugoslavia. 
Throughout the 1980s religious celebrations conducted both by the Serbian Orthodox 
Church and Catholic Church became signifiers of ‘national awakening’ and a channel 
for nationalist euphoria. Both churches conducted massive religious celebrations. 
One held in Croatia in the national shrine of Marija Bistrica gathered, according to 
                                                 
4 Rogers Brubaker, “Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches”, Nations and Nationalism 18:1 (2012), 
2–20, 4.  
5 Politicisation of culture has been directly connected with politicized religion and its close relation to 
nationalism. And politicized religion, as Brubaker argues, claims to restructure public life in 
accordance to religious principles. Brubaker, “Religion and Nationalism”, 6.  
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the church, almost “half a million pilgrims.”6 The National Eucharistic Congress, 
opened on the 8th of September by papal legate, followed by vigils, had the aim of 
presenting the history of Croatian people as a Catholic nation, emphasising the close 
links between the church, nationhood and statehood. In those narratives, Croatian 
people were labelled as “the people of God.”7 In a similar way, the 600th anniversary 
of the Kosovo battle in 1989 represented the beginning of a new era in the 
relationship between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the state. This event that the 
official media characterized as the biggest gathering of Serbs in the century, meant 
not only that nationalists had taken power, but that in that distribution of power the 
church would maintain an important role as the main ‘keeper’ and ‘protector’ of 
Serbian national identity. 
The introduction of religion into the political sphere signified the power that 
religion will have for the definitions of membership in new national states. At that 
time it was already clear that for the Church, both Catholic and Orthodox, the 
concept of membership from the religious point of view, was reduced to an ethnic 
dimension: the members, or the potential members of the Church, are considered as 
either ethnic Croats or Serbs. The wider understanding of political membership has 
been shaped on a similar model of belonging to the same ethnic group.  
 
2.1. Ethnocentrism and Ethnophyletism 
 
Glorification of one’s ethnic belonging by the church is called ethnophyletism8, which 
I argue has had large influence on the political communities. Although this term was 
coined in the Orthodox Church I am using it here as a wider concept, because of its 
proximity to the concept of ‘religious nationalism’ in a wider sense. The term – 
ethnophyletismos (Eθνοφυλετισμος) can be translated as national tribalism, and it 
basically means the rejection of the concept of the universal in favour of the national 
and a belief in a “nation’s pre-eminent place under God.”9  
We could say that ethnophyletism in religious language stands for what 
ethnocentrism similarly represents in the political domain. When we speak about 
ethnocentrism we are coming from the perspective of the political community, while 
ethnophyletism refers to the religious perspective of membership in the religious 
community: they can mutually shape each other. These two concepts in the Balkans 
link in a peculiar way: ethnophyletism is not an isolated phenomenon, as it is 
precisely through this concept that the Church expresses its ethnocentric 
understanding of modern state and nationhood. I argue that ethnophyletism 
                                                 
6 Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 68.  
7 Ibid, 71.  
8 Ethnophyletism has been particularly condemned by Orthodox Churches as it does not reflect the 
universal dimension of Orthodox Christianity but idolizes the nation. 
9 Eris Waver Beckett, National Narcissism: The Intersection of Nationalist Cult and Gender in Hungary 
(Bern: Peter Lang, International Academic Publishers, 2006), 159.  
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supports ethnocentrism. Ethnophyletism represents ‘ethnification of the sacred’, 
which is usually followed by the ‘sacralisation of the profane’: the nation derives its 
‘sacredness’ from religion itself. This is not characteristic only for the Orthodox 
Church, but for all major religious communities, which is precisely the reason why 
religion is such a powerful agent for building the nation’s cultural and political 
identity. The fine links between ethnophyletism and ethnocentrism have been 
exposed through a number of identitarian narratives.  
 
2.2. Identitarian Narratives 
 
Identities are “created, transmitted, revised and undermined” through particular 
narratives.10 Ethno-religious narratives have been essential for nation-building 
processes and reinforcement of ethnicity in the political sphere. In a number of 
ethno-religious narratives the nation is perceived as an ‘eternal’ concept, beyond 
time and history. The discourse used in those narratives that aims to emphasize the 
national specificity is the religious language: for instance, the notion of “the national 
soul”11, an abstract term with religious connotation, has been exploited both by 
politicians and church leaders. Identitarian narratives have also targeted the ‘foreign 
Other’: in Serbia, against Muslims and Catholics, who were portrayed as enemies of 
Orthodox Serbs. Bosniak nationalism has been based on premises of protection of 
Bosniak Muslim identity in Bosnia, endangered by Serbian or Croatian nationalists. 
Croats started portraying themselves as antemuralia christianitatis and the others as 
Balkanic barbarians that are endangering Croatia’s place in Central Europe and, 
generally, in Western Europe, the place secured by their belonging to the Western 
Church. Historical revisionism, victimization and vilification as a part of ‘historical 
memory’, became part of those narratives, which were to a great extent formed by 
the religious institutions.12 By the end of the war national-religious narratives were 
deeply embedded in state symbols, and religious rituals once shifted from ‘sacred 
space’ into the terrain of the profane, became a part of public rituals, intertwined 
with the official state celebrations.  
Identitarian politics have also been reflected through constitutional 
nationalism.13 Despite the constitutions being secular and not religious, it is this 
triadic nexus between political community, ethnic belonging and religious affiliation 
that allows this to happen, pulling resources from the religious and ethnic in order to 
reinforce a particular notion of the political. For instance, both Croatian14 and Serbian 
                                                 
10 Richard Ned Lebow, The Politics and Ethics of Identity: In Search of Ourselves (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 46. 
11 Anthony D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (London: Duckworth, 1971), 23.  
12 See Grupa autora, Jagnje Božije i Zvijer iz Bezdana, available at: 
http://ponude.biz/knjige/j/Jagnje%20Bozije%20i%20zvijer%20iz%20bezdana.pdf  
13 Robert M. Hayden, “Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics”, Slavic Review, 
51:4 (1992), 654-673.  
14 http://www.zakon.hr/z/94/Ustav-Republike-Hrvatske.  
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constitutions15 in the first place define their states as states of Croatian/Serbian 
people, while the constitution of BiH, as already mentioned, recognizes only three 
constitutive nations: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. Ethnicity has been frequently 
proven through religious affiliation and for some time in Croatia, for instance, 
“Catholic Church certificates were also accepted by state authorities”16 as a sufficient 
proof of Croatian ethnicity for the purposes of citizenship acquisition. The new 
Serbian Constitution from 2006 takes identity as something that exists even before 
birth17, and thus it is not surprising that in post-Milošević Serbia identitarian politics 
have been formalized through a number of state symbols: the flag, the royal coat of 
arms, and national anthem that testify to the introduction of religious into political / 
public sphere.  
Further, identitarian narratives support forms of ‘transborder nationalism’,18 
in which religious institutions frequently engage. The disputes over territories have 
been frequently backed-up by religious leaders. For example, in the territories where 
the Serbian Orthodox Church is historically present, such as Montenegro and 
Kosovo, claims for preservation of Serbian national identity have frequently masked 
territorial aspirations. How political communities understand and perceive 
membership has changed over the years, together with the changing and creation of 
the borders of the new states. None the less identitarian narratives of the religious 
institutions shaped the perceptions of political membership that was frequently 
perceived as a religious-ethnic territorial-bonded notion.  
 
3 Religion and citizenship in Montenegro, Serbia and BiH 
 
In this section, I will analyse the influences of religion and religious institutions on 
political communities in three different contexts in which citizenship is interpreted as 
civic, ethnocentric, and multi-ethnic. My analysis is focussed upon: 1) the role of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church in the dispute over ‘Montenegrin identity’ in the 
Referendum for Independence in 2006, and the 2011 Census; 2) The influence of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church on the Serbian political community in the dispute over 
Kosovo’s independence in 2008 and its influence on the perception of demos through 
identitarian narratives of the Kosovo myth; 3) Ethno-confessional identity and 
political membership in BiH, including the relationship between Bosniak nation-
building and Islamic Community. What is common for all three cases is that in spite 
of the different contexts religion has been a) an important political agent in defining 
                                                 
15 http://www.ustavni.sud.rs/page/view/sr-Latn-CS/70-100028/ustav-republike-srbije.  
16 Francesco Ragazzi, Igor Štiks, Viktor Koska, “Country Report: Croatia”, EUDO Citizenship 
Observatory, 2013, 8. Available at: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/CountryReports/Croatia.pdf.   
17 Jelena Vasiljević, “Citizenship and belonging in Serbia: in the crossfire of changing nationhood 
narratives”, CITSEE Working Paper 2011/17. Available at: 
http://www.citsee.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/108908/327_citizenshipandbelonginginserbiain
thecrossfireofchangingnationhoodnarratives.pdf  
18 See Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5.  
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or influencing the criteria of membership in the national polity; b) a tool for nation-
building; c) by the practice of ethnophyletism empowering general ethnocentrism 
(both on state and sub-state levels). More concretely, I explore the influence that 
religious institutions have had on political communities at the times when specific 
ethno-religious identities have been considered as being ‘endangered’ by ‘external’ 
factors.  
 
3.1. The dispute between two churches in Montenegro: referendum and census 
 
Montenegro became an independent state in 2006 out of the “dissolution of two 
federations and one state union.”19 As Džankić argues, Montenegrin politics since the 
1990s until 2006 was marked by eternal divisions equally over the issue of 
independence and national identity.20 The issue of the identity of Montenegrins as 
either “a separate nation” or Serbian “sub-group” predominated on the political 
scene and in post-2006 remained one of the central issues for the Orthodox 
Metropolitanate of Montenegro – an eparchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The 
issue of defining demos and members of the polity became a crucial issue for the 
church. After 2006, the process of “nationalizing” the state had direct consequences 
on citizenship policies, which as Džankić points out became “tools of political 
manoeuvring.”21 The re-construction of Montenegrin nationhood was marked by 
diverging from Serbian nationalism, and the creation of specific national-religious 
identity through the formation of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church in 1993, and 
later on the Montenegrin language. The dispute between the two Orthodox churches 
in Montenegro reveals deep conflicts over Montenegrin identity and consequently 
the understanding of political membership in Montenegro and states in general.  
The Orthodox Metropolitanate centred in Cetinje, the former capital of 
Montenegro, is one of the four metropolitanates of the Serbian Orthodox Church. 
Although Montenegro has a de jure civic citizenship regime,22 the concepts of 
belonging have been built upon two polarized identiterian politics embodied in two 
churches: Montenegrin and Serbian, as one of the main competing actors in 
communicating political identities of Montenegro. The conflict of “dual identities”23 
transferred into the field of religion. Religion became one of the most important 
sources for defining competing identities, and a tool for nation-building. For the 
Serbian Church the Montenegrin nation was a communist invention. The 
involvement of the Serbian Metropolitanate in political matters closely related to the 
                                                 




20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid, 2.  
22 Ibid.   
23 Ibid.  
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issues of cultural and national identity and statehood has been somewhat resourced 
from the tradition of theocracy24, when the ecclesiastical authorities were at the same 
time the rulers of Montenegro, in order to preserve a specific autochthonous identity 
in the face of the Ottoman Empire. The Orthodox Church relied upon this tradition in 
legitimizing its political role in contemporary Montenegrin society, at the same time 
proclaiming itself as a ‘preserver and defender’ of Serbian identity in Montenegro.  
Since the 1990s, the Metropolitanate developed and established itself as one of 
the crucial political players, not only in Montenegro but in neighbouring Serbia. The 
close links between the Metropolitanate and some of the political structures in 
Montenegro, Serbia, and Serbian leaders in BiH, renewal of the eparchial institutions, 
and various religious-political activities often on the edge of controversy, led to self-
recognition of Metropolitanate as a defender of ‘Serbian identity’. The 
Metropolitanate has been politically active since the early 1990s, and put significant 
effort into its attempt to justify the war operations in former Yugoslavia and 
particularly the aggression against BiH. Its discourse was always anti-Western and 
anti-European and quite frequently its leader did not try to hide his support and 
admiration for war criminals.25 It is not surprising that the Serbian Metropolitan of 
Montenegro has been seen as one of the most radical right-wing bishops of the 
Serbian Church. Furthermore, it is worth saying that the Metropolitan of Montenegro 
has an honorary title of “the exarch of the holy throne of Peć”, which is meant to 
signify close, almost ‘organic’, links with Kosovo – ‘the cradle of Serbdom’. 
Precedence of the Metropolitan in relation to Kosovo, even on a symbolic level, has 
been particularly exploited for the political purposes and strengthening of Serbian 
national identity in Montenegro. 
A number of the Metropolitanate’s activities, such as reconstruction of the 
Njegoš’ Chapel (Njegoševa Kapela) on the mountain Lovćen26, or the placing of a 
metal church on the mountain Rumija using an army helicopter, on both symbolical 
and political levels aimed to re-confirm multi-ethnic Montenegro as a Serbian land. 
Identiterian narratives had a similar function of reinforcing the sense of Serbian 
national identity and, more importantly, preventing alienation from the ethnic 
concept of the state. Those narratives constructed upon mythical language and epic 
poetry, promoted the ‘Serbdom of Montenegrin warriors’ as the essence of 
                                                 
24 Bishops of the house of Petrović were ate the same time the rulers of Montenegro.  
25 Metropolitan Amfilohije who was the biggest critic of the Hague Tribunal claiming that it was 
formed to put only Serbs on trial, has openly admitted that he was offering shelter to Radovan 
Karadzić in 1995, saying that Montenegro was always a ‘shelter of hajduks’, See: Dimitrije Jovićević, 




26 The new chapel designed by Ivan Mestrovic re-opened in 1974, the church characterized as 
‘mausoleum of pharaoh’ unworthy of Njegoš. Savo Gregorovic, “Amfilohije: Crkva Njegoševa a ne 
kraljeva”, Vecernje Novosti, 30 June 2012. Available at: 
http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/planeta.300.html:386437-Amfilohije-Crkva-Njegoseva-a-ne-kraljeva  
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Montenegrin identity. Religious identiterian narratives have been constructed on a 
dichotomous relationship between Self and foreign ‘Other’ embodied either in 
‘West’, Catholics, or Muslims. Anti-Europeanism as well as ‘anti-Montenegrinism’ is 
thus based on the same ‘transcendental’ discourse of holiness of Serbs that is 
endangered by others from communists to European multiculturalists. As in the 
epics, the community is understood as a community of blood rather than political 
community27: membership is thus confirmed through the ethno-religious belonging 
which leaves the ‘eternal Other’ in the category of ‘mythical enemy’.  
On the other hand, the Montenegrin Orthodox Church established in 1993 is 
not canonically recognized by other orthodox churches; nonetheless it became one of 
the main tools of the nation-building process. Montenegrin nationalism is closely 
connected with the new Montenegrin church. Although a counter-reaction to Serbian 
nationalism and the radicalism of the Metropolitanate, it is not ethnically neutral but 
based on similar premises as the one it tries to annul. The newly established Church 
claimed that the sovereignty and unique ethnic–cultural tradition of Montenegrins 
had been ‘invaded’ by Serbs. ‘Montenegrism’ thus replaced Serbian nationalism, and 
a battle for Montenegrin cultural-national identity became a religious matter. As 
Perica argues, “Montenegro will become a full-fledged nation…not when the great 
powers say so, but when the Orthodox Church of Montenegro is granted 
autocephaly by other Orthodox churches.”28 The dispute between the churches 
spread from canonical onto the issue of Montenegrin language which Serbian 
Metropolitan called an “artificial language”29 whose introduction aims to destroy the 
Serbian national identity of Montenegrins.  
When identity has been perceived to be endangered by external political 
circumstances or pressures, identitarian narratives have been particularly used in the 
public sphere; the Serbian Metropolitanate has entered into an open conflict with 
what it perceived as the ‘pro-Montenegrin’ political establishment. On two occasions, 
first in response to the referendum in 2006 and then in response to the 2011 census, 
the church was particularly active in appealing to polity members. The Serbian 
Orthodox Church was the biggest opponent of Montenegrin independence. Since for 
the Metropolitanate, the Montenegrin nation was a “product of a communist anti-
Serbian doctrine”30, the 2006 Referendum was followed by the reproduction of a 
number of narratives about a historical connection between Serbia and Montenegro, 
                                                 
27 See Andrew Wachtel, “Citizenship and Belonging: Literary Themes and Variations from 
Yugoslavia”, CITSEE Working Paper 2010/12, 2. Available at: 
http://www.citsee.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/108875/228_citizenshipandbelongingliterarythe
mesandvariationsfromyugoslavia.pdf. 
28 Perica, Balkan Idols, 216.  
29 “Amfilohije: Crnogorski jezik izmišljen”, RTS, 14 January 2011. Available at: 
http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/11/Region/826460/Amfilohije%3A+Crnogorski+jezik+izmi%C5
%A1ljen.html. 
30 My translation. See Aleksandar Stamatović, Kratka istorija mitropolije crnogorsko-primorske (1219-1999), 
Glava VII Mitropolit Amfilohije Radovic i nase vrijeme, Projekat Rastko. Available at: 
http://www.rastko.rs/rastko-cg/povijest/istorijat/istorijat_1.html.  
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referring to historic figures from the Montenegrin past. Calling Montenegro the “urn 
of tzar Dušan’s ashes”31, was an attempt by the Serbian Metropolitanate to convince 
citizens of the existence of a natural bond between two sister states and the common 
ethnic-religious-cultural identity. Nonetheless, independence was not the biggest 
issue for the church as Montenegro was independent in different historical periods; it 
was precisely the question of ethno-religious identity that remained the central issue. 
In other words, the Church focussed upon the questions of: who are the members, 
what is their identity, who constitutes the demos and therefore dictates the cultural-
religious identity of the new independent state. The battle for identity continued, and 
it became clear that for both competing sides, pro-Serbian led by the Serbian 
Metropolitanate, and pro-Montenegrin led by the Government and political parties 
of which some were closely linked to Montenegrin church, the concept of political 
membership was strongly based on ethno-religious identity.  
Just before the Census in 2011, the Serbian Metropolitan called a meeting of 
the pro-Serbian political parties in one of the Montenegrin monasteries32, also 
inviting the Serbian ambassador. During the ‘census campaign’ in 2011 the 
Metropolitan appealed to citizens not to be afraid to declare themselves as ethnic 
Serbs, in spite of the numerous pressures of the officials.33 The Metropolitanate 
emphasized that the Serbian church and language have been victims of the 
Montenegrin nationalism and the ongoing anti-Serbian campaign. After the Census, 
the Metropolitanate appealed to its members that there is “no permanent identity” 
and invited citizens to remain in the church as the only source of permanent 
identity.34 On the other hand, politicization and restrictiveness in the acquisitions of 
citizenship as the means of consolidating internal divisions35 for the Serbian Church 
was a political act aimed to ‘control identity’ by making a number of the clergy 
foreign citizens.36  
Membership, especially through practices and applied policies, is still 
perceived as membership in a particular nation/ethnicity with a specific linguistic 
and religious tradition. The Serbian Orthodox Metropolitanate has shown that 
religious nationalism and ethnophyletism are deeply rooted in the church. On the 
other side, the example of the Montenegrin Church, a new political agent on the 
scene with its own ‘nation-building agenda’, and the support it has received from the 
                                                 
31 My translation. “Prpić veliki i mali”, Peščanik, 19 May 2006. Available at: 
http://www.b92.net/info/emisije/pescanik.php?yyyy=2006&mm=05&nav_id=198498.  
32 “Mitroplolit Amfilohije sa liderima srpskih partija”, RTV, 8 February 2011. Available at: 
http://rtv.co.rs/sr_lat/region/mitropolit-amfilohije-sa-liderima-srpskih-partija_237762.html  
33 Miodrag Vuković, “Popis u Crnoj gori: sve je dignuto na noge što može hodati”, Nova srpska politicka 
misao. Available at: http://www.nspm.rs/srbija-i-crna-gora/popis-u-crnoj-gori.html?alphabet=l  
34 “Amfilohije: Ovdje nemamo postojana grada, a time ni identiteta”, Vijesti online, 21 April 2011. 
Available at: http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/amfilohije-ovdje-nemamo-postojana-grada-a-time-ni-
identiteta   
35 Džankić, “Lineages of Citizenship in Montenegro”, 21.  
36 See Velibor Dzomić, “Srpska crkva i ‘nova politika’”, Novi Standard, 25 January 2013. 
http://www.standard.rs/dr-velibor-dzomic-srpska-crkva-i-nova-politika.html  
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pro-Montenegrin citizens, shows that the church is in a way ‘expected’ by the polity 
to embrace the role of a keeper of national identity. In both cases membership in the 
church defines national identity. The battle over the demos in the religious sphere 
reveals the ethnocentric tendencies of the otherwise constitutionally ‘civic state’.  
 
3.2. Kosovo and the Serbian Orthodox Church - dispute over territory, identity and 
membership 
 
The Kosovo myth has been central for the religious-national narratives of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church. The Kosovo myth was the basis on which the church and 
nationalists constructed strong identitarian narratives that were essential for Serbian 
nationalism, and decisive for further definitions of nationhood, state, society and 
culture. Since the 1980s the 28th of June, the date of the Kosovo battle, has been a date 
with a symbolic-mythological meaning for Serbs, or at least for the church and 
populist press. When Milošević was arrested and delivered to The Hague on the 
same date, church leaders compared it to the betrayal in Kosovo, but others noted 
that Milosevic’s rule started and finished around the same mythological date. 
Kosovo was the reason for the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) in 1999, and continuously has been one of the central political issues 
both for politicians and the church.  
The Kosovo myth thus remained the most exploited myth in the recent 
Serbian history, both by the state and the church. In 2006 it was precisely because of 
the Kosovo issue that the Serbian Parliament adopted a new Constitution, in which 
Kosovo was defined as an integral part of Serbia. In this way, the government 
condemned any future independence of Kosovo as an illegal act. When Kosovo 
declared its independence in 2008, the Serbian Orthodox Church was one of the most 
important political actors to place pressure on state institutions, politicians and the 
public for the preservation of Kosovo’s territory. After the landmark agreement 
between Kosovo and Serbian politicians was signed in 2013, the Church expressed its 
disagreement with the official political actors, initiating a boycott of Serbian 
politicians in Kosovo. In both cases the Serbian Church acted as political agent and 
supreme authority in the issues of the territory, Serbian identity and demos in 
Kosovo.  
The impacts and importance of the Kosovo myth have been analysed by a 
number of scholars, as an inevitable topic in studies on Serbian nationalism and 
nationhood narratives. Among many aspects of the Kosovo Myth, one is of particular 
interest for this paper, and that is how through the narratives of the Kosovo myth, 
specific understandings of belonging and membership are defined and transferred 
onto political communities. A battle over political space through identitarian 
narratives of Kosovo as a ‘heart of Serbia’ has influenced the understandings of 
citizenship in a sense that the political membership is perceived as belonging to the 
specific ethnic-religious group who should remain within the boundaries of a 
‘mother-state’.  
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The concept of belonging that stems from Kosovo myth ideology is two-
dimensional: it is a territorial matter, as well as a matter of ethnicity, ethics and 
religion.  Religious narratives of the Kosovo Myth have focussed upon the legend of 
a choice given to the 13th century Prince lazar between the ‘kingdom of earth’ and 
‘kingdom of heaven’ and the ‘covenant’ between the Serbian people and God. It is 
the “deep symbolism” of Kosovo that enabled the multi-dimensionality of its 
rhetoric: more than one historical and political reality, religious and ethical 
dimension.37 Precisely because of its deep symbolic level the construction of Self and 
Other has not changed – although a “historical referent” may change, the “initial 
historical differentiation”38 remains. As a ‘Serbian Jerusalem’39 and the place where 
Serbs chose the ‘kingdom of heaven’, Kosovo remained symbolically and thus 
territorially important.  
Belonging to Serbian nation implies belonging to Orthodoxy, from which the 
nation derives its sacredness and that at the same time shapes its cultural and 
spiritual specificity and identity. Kosovo for the church and politicians became thus 
not only the territory where Serbs live (though in minority), but the territory that is 
marked as a “cradle of the nation”40 to which therefore the nation has a historical 
right.  
The Kosovo religious-national narrative has been translated into political 
language and has strongly influenced political communities in Serbia. Those 
narratives were particularly exploited in 2008 when Kosovo proclaimed its 
independence. The proclamation of independence was marked by a series of 
protests, in Serbia, BiH (in the Republic of Srpska entity), and abroad. The protest 
under the name “Kosovo is Serbia” held in Belgrade united church and political 
leaders, and although initially announced as peaceful demonstrations, ended with 
street riots and the burning of many Western embassies, including the US Embassy.41 
Narratives of Kosovo as the holy land and the ‘sacredness’ of the Serbian nation 
marked the protests revealing what Bakic-Hayden calls “the reality of Kosovo 
                                                 
37 See Milica Bakic-Hayden, “Kosovo: Reality of a Myth and Myth of Many Realities”, in Luka Walter 
et al (eds), Serbien und Montenegro (Vienna: Österreichische Osthefte, 2006), 133-43. 
38 Ibid, 143.  
39 The words from the Psalm 137: “If I forget thee o Jerusalem let my right hand forget her cunning” 
were used many times by the Church leaders, the last time by Serbian Patriarch Irinej who at the 
celebration of Christmas in 2013 greeted the faithful with the words “If I forget thee o Kosovo and 
Metohija, let my right hand forget my cunning”. “Bozic mira i radosti”, Vecernje novosti, 7 January 
2013. Available at: http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/aktuelno.290.html:413655-Bozic-mira-i-
radosti.  
40 See “Odrzan miting: Kosovo je Srbija”, B92, 21 September 2008. Available at: 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=02&dd=21&nav_category=640&nav_id=285
780.  
41 “Protestors attack U.S. Embassy in Belgrade”, New York Times, 22 February 2008. Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/world/europe/22kosovo.html?_r=0.    
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tradition” as a powerful source of national mobilization and in that sense more than 
an “unreal construction.”42  
Since 2008 the Serbian Church has remained the strongest opponent to any 
political agreements with Kosovo’s authorities. The problem of Kosovo became again 
one of the central political issues in Serbia. The anti-Western and anti-European 
discourse, the divisions on ‘martyrs and traitors’ prevailed in media and church 
discourse influencing also the political scene; the pro-European Democratic Party 
(DS) launched its political programme under the slogan “both Kosovo and Europe”.43 
Partition of Kosovo, with the North of Kosovo of majority Serbian population 
integrating with Serbia, has been seen as one of the possibilities that would bring 
‘unification of the Serbian being.’ The mythological language used by the radical 
politicians and the church presented the territorial issue as a cultural and spiritual 
matter, and the 1990s narratives of “all Serbs in one state” re-emerged, this time as a 
matter of spiritual identity. Kosovo independence has been thus perceived and 
represented as the last attack of the ‘West’ against Serbian unique identity and 
culture. Shortly before the deadline for the Serbian Government by the EU in April 
2013, Serbian Orthodox Church appealed to the public with the words that “Kosovo 
is too high a price to pay for the EU”44 putting the pressure on ruling coalition. In one 
of its official letters to the Government, the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church made this appeal: 
 
“It is perfectly clear to every reasonable man that the Western powers, after 
the NATO bombing war [in 1999] are step-by-step creating the state of 
Kosovo for Kosovo Albanians while getting Serbia to act as their accomplice... 
cutting her jugular and taking its heart from its bosom, her holy land of Kosovo 
and Metohija.”45 
 
After the agreement between Serbia and Kosovo was signed, several of the 
most radical church leaders reacted strongly against the Serbian government46, which 
led to further (though small) protests. Right wing parties and a number of the church 
leaders characterized the signing of the agreement as a betrayal.47  
                                                 
42 See Bakic-Hayden, “Kosovo”, 143.  
43 “Tadić: Potvrđena politika ‘I Evropa i Kosovo’”, Blic online, 24 February 2012. Available at: 
http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/308827/Tadic-Potvrdjena-politika-I-Evropa-i-Kosovo.  
44 See “Kosovo too high a price to pay for EU, Serbian church says”, Reuters, 6 April 2013. Available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/06/us-serbia-kosovo-church-idUSBRE93508720130406.  
45 My italics. Bojana Barlovac, “Serbian Church Accuses Govt of 'Suicide' on Kosovo”, Balkan Insight, 
n.d. Available at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbian-orthodox-church-criticizes-state-
on-kosovo-policy.  
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The Kosovo theme that “has had a number of variations over the centuries” 
has remained at the heart of ethno-religious narratives and has been essential for 
what Bakić-Hayden called a “hybrid form” of Kosovo Myth embodied in 
“ethnonationalism and populism.”48 I argue that there are two crucial aspects that 
stem from the Kosovo Myth narratives: ethnophyletism and ethnocentrism, which 
has direct impacts on political membership and citizenship in Serbia. Membership is 
perceived as belonging to the ‘holy community’ and demos is in this sense defined 
by the national-religious belonging, which is to be included into the territorial 
borders. Territory is symbolically perceived as a ‘body’ of the holy nation which 
cannot function without its “jugular” - Kosovo. Kosovo is essential for the 
identitarian politics of the church as it is a marker of Serbian identity that is defined 
through ‘belonging to Christ’, or his church.  
In those narratives demos is understood as a “community of Orthodox Serbs”, 
and moved into the mythic sphere. Political membership, equality of all citizens, is 
confused with the concepts of belonging to a ‘sacred nation’. It comes as no surprise 
then that Serbian citizenship regime, similarly to Croatian one, offers a privileged 
access to citizenship to all Serbs, ‘in the region and abroad’.  
 
3.3. BiH and the ethno-confessional identity as a basis of political membership  
 
In Bosnia, just as in the rest of the Balkans, religious institutions gained a significant 
role through the Ottoman Empire’s system of millets, which distinguished population 
according to confession and ethnicity that frequently overlapped.49 In this way the 
political communities were determined by their non-territorial ethno-religious 
identity.50  
The Ottoman citizenship project, as Sarajlić argues, had the opposite effect: 
instead of establishing common nationality, it reinforced the millet distinctions it 
aimed to reduce.51 In Bosnia and Herzegovina the concept of political membership 
based on confessional identities was formally institutionalized for the first time 
under Austria-Hungary by the Land Statute of Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1910. 
Political membership based on confessional membership thus became a pre-
condition for getting access to collective rights.52  
Almost ninety years later after the Austro-Hungarian Statute for Bosnia, the 
post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina is divided on similar, ethnic principles, facing 
                                                 
48 See Bakic-Hayden, “Kosovo”, 143. 
49 Dino Abazović, Religija u tranziciji (Sarajevo: Rabic, 2010), 45-46.  
50 Marc Weller and Sefan Wolff (eds.), Self-governance and Conflict Resolution (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 15. 
51 Paraphrased; Eldar Sarajlić, “ A Citizenship Beyond the Nation-State: Dilemmas of the 
‘Europeanisation’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, CITSEE Working Paper 2010/09, 4. Available at: 
http://www.citsee.ed.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/108871/232_acitizenshipbeyondthenationstated
ilemmasoftheeuropeanisationofbosniaandherzegovi.pdf.  
52 Abazović, Religija u tranziciji, 46.  
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a number of issues related to political membership and identities. The current 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina53 strengthened further ethno-centrism at the 
sub-state level and introduced new issues in understanding the political 
membership. Membership in the state (citizenship) is based on membership in entity 
(entity citizenship), and entities have been initially constructed on a principle of 
ethnic belonging (although the Constitutional Court made all citizens equal 
throughout BiH). The ethno-political constitutional framework excludes ‘others’ and 
privileges three constitutive nations (Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks). The concept of 
political community is structured on ethnicity, while ethnicity is defined by religious 
belonging. This introduced a number of conceptual problems and confusion in 
understanding of political membership, opening the door for “confessional 
homogenization”54, which since the 1990s has been intertwined with ethnic 
homogenisation. As Blagojević further argues, the latter would be difficult to 
accomplish without the former.  
In BiH the position of Bosnian Muslims has changed historically within 
several different states established on this territory. The Islamic faith community, 
established in 1882, became a “unique religious organisation”55 and from 1947 a 
central body for all Muslims in Yugoslavia on the territory of Yugoslavia. The 
Central Committee of the League of Communists of BiH declared Bosnian Muslims 
(as well as the Muslims from all territories of Yugoslavia) as a “full-fledged 
nationality,”56 and introduced “nationality with a religious name”57 – Muslims were 
treated as a nationally undeclared group until the Census in 1971, when the ethnic 
name Muslim (not to be confused with ‘muslim’ as a religious category) was 
included in the census.58 This has caused certain inner “frictions” in self-perception of 
Muslims ‘dividing them’ into two streams: those who perceived the new term in a 
secular sense and as a marker of national identity, and those who saw it as 
inseparable from religious – Muslim identity.59 Fractions such as Young Muslims, led 
by Alija Izetbegović in the 1970s, argued that Islam is inseparable from the Muslim 
national identity.60 Since Muslims, as Perica points out, “did not have myths of their 
own” of being “aliens in their native land”61, they have been “unequal partners in the 
                                                 
53 Annex 4: Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, University of Minnesota, Human Rights Library. 
Available at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/icty/dayton/daytonannex4.html.  
54 Mirko Blagojevic, “Revitalisation of Religion and Dialogue” in Milan Vukomanovic and Marinko 
Vucinic, (eds.), Religious Dialogue in the Balkans: the Drama of Understanding (Beograd: Belgrade Open 
School), 218. Available at: 
http://veraznanjemir.bos.rs/materijal/knjige/religious_dialogue.pdf#page=218.   
55 Abazović, Religija u tranziciji, 81.  
56 Perica, Balkan Idols, 75. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Abazović, Religija u tranziciji,12.  
59 Paraphrased. Ibid, 76.  
60 For wider discussion see Ibid, 76-77.  
61 Ibid, 74 
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religious-nationalist competition in Yugoslavia.”62 Alija Izetbegović’s group Young 
Muslims “envisioned a new Muslim national identity in which religion would play a 
key role”63, which at the time did not reach a wider audience but secured its author a 
place in prison and a certain prestige at the moment of first democratic elections in 
1990, which eventually brought him to power.  
The Islamic Community was a pan-Yugoslav, multi-ethnic federation of 
autonomous institutions that covered ethnic Slavic Muslims, Albanians, Turks, and 
included some of the Sufi orders, differently from the Christian churches that were 
strongly linked to their ethnic communities.64 In the 1980s with the expansion of 
Serbian and Croatian nationalism the issue of national identity became central for 
Bosnian Muslims as well.65 Lacking cultural institutions, the Islamic Community 
became for Bosnian Muslims what Abazović called a “surrogate of national 
community”66 until the late 1980s, when political parties that were representing the 
interests of Bosnian Muslims were formed. With the escalation of the war and the 
aggression against BiH, re-structuring of both national and political identity took 
place.67  
The name “Bosniak” was in official use from 1993 for determination of a 
political and national group, while the term Muslim retained its original meaning 
and has been used again only as a religious category.68 The term Bosniak replaced the 
term Muslim as an ethnic category first in the changes and amendments to the 
Constitutional Law of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be later inserted 
into the Constitution of BiH.69 These initial changes, according to Abazović, took 
place at the time when the “Owen-Stoltenberg plan” was proposed. Therefore, when 
speaking about Bosnian Muslims and Bosniak identity, it is important to understand 
it within the specific context of BiH, where Serbian and Croatian nationalism have 
also played a significant role: both Serb and Croat nationalists had territorial 
aspirations in Bosnia, including Serbia and Croatia as states; both groups have been 
traditionally claiming that Muslims are either ethnic Serbs or Croats converted to 
Islam. After the war in the 1990s, Islam in BiH “served as a tool of identity building 
of an ethnic community, rather than as a final destination of identity politics.”70 
Islamic Community certainly played an important role in establishing Bosniak 
national and cultural identity, and in that respect Islam in Bosnia had a “distinctly 
                                                 
62 Ibid, 75.  
63 Ibid, 77. 
64 Paraphrased. For more see: Ibid, 79. 
65 See Ibid, 86.  
66 Ibid, 12.  
67 Ibid, 13.  
68 Ibid.  
69 Ibid, 97.  
70 Eldar Sarajlić, “The Return of the Consuls: Islamic networks and foreign policy perspectives in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina”, paper presented at the conference “After the Wahabi Mirage: Islam, politics 
and international networks in the Balkans’, organised by the European Studies Centre and University 
of Oxford, Oxford, 2010, 9. Available at: http://balkanmuslims.com/pdf/Sarajlic-Bosnia.pdf.  
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ethnic role”71, as Sarajlic points out. Religious language has been instrumentalised 
and used for political purposes, and a number of political parties and leaders 
affiliated themselves with religious institutions.  
The 2013 census in BiH further expanded public debates on what is the 
relevant polity, who is a member, who belongs, and where? The dispute and 
discussions have been triggered over the issue of Bosnian identity as belonging to 
BiH as a state and as civic membership, and the question of ‘Bosniak or Bosnian’ 
became a matter of extensive public debates, especially among the Bosniak 
population. For religious leaders the concept of political membership remained 
inseparable from confessional identity, despite the fact that public opinion has been 
divided on this issue. Faced with the prospect that many Bosniaks, especially in big 
cities, resent ethnic and religious categories and are ready to declare themselves as 
only Bosnians, and thus reaffirm their loyalty to the state of BiH rather than to any 
particular ethnic or religious group, the Islamic Community in BiH encouraged its 
members to declare themselves as Bosniaks ethno-nationally and as ‘Muslims’ 
religiously. One can notice certain tendencies such as for instance that the term 
Bosniak should stand for one nation of BiH, which is differentiated only by religious 
belonging but not by ethnicity, which Eldar Sarajlic criticised as being “nationalism 
of Bosniak anti-nationalists.”72 The other stream insists on the term Bosniak as a 
specific ethnic category that is based on traditional Islamic identity, but is at the same 
time open for those Bosniaks of Muslim background that do not practice Islam.  
For the religious leaders nation-building became one of the major political 
tasks, and in that respect ethnoclericalism did not bypass the Islamic Community. 
Mustafa Cerić, since becoming a leader of the Islamic Community has been a strong 
advocate of religious, cultural and political sovereignty of the Bosniak nation. 
However the issue of Bosniak nationhood has been expended by Cerić onto the other 
territories of former Yugoslavia and Muslims in those territories. Just before the 
census in Montenegro in 2011, Mustafa Cerić together with Sandzak Mufti Muamer 
Zukorlić, appealed to Montenegrin Muslims to declare themselves as Bosniaks of 
Islamic faith.73 Although Cerić and Zukorlić argued that all Muslims in Former 
Yugoslavia share specific national-cultural identity, opinions remain divided: for 
Montenegrin Muslims for instance, the choice between Bosniak and Muslim, has 
imposed a number of dilemmas, as well as in Sandžak.74  
Narratives structured around the issue of Bosniak nationhood have been 
predominantly narratives about the suffering and genocide. They have been widely 
exploited by religious leaders in order to deliver an important political message, for 
                                                 
71 Ibid, 8.  
72 Eldar Sarajlić, “Blentavi nacionalizam Besima Spahica”, Radio Sarejevo, 2 April 2012. Available at: 
http://www.radiosarajevo.ba/novost/77940/eldar-sarajlic-blentavi-nacionalizam-besima-spahica.  
73 “Zukorlić i Cerić: Na popis kao Bošnjaci”, Vesti, 27 June 2011. Available at:  
http://www.kurir-info.rs/zukorlic-i-ceric-na-popis-kao-bosnjaci-clanak-81243.  
74 Bohdana Dimitrovova, “Bosniak or Muslim? Dilemma of one Nation with two Names”, Southeast 
European Politics, II:2 (2001), 94-108.  Available at: http://www.seep.ceu.hu/issue22/dimitrovova.pdf.  
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instance on several occasions Mustafa Ceric as well as Muarem Zukorlić reminded 
Bosniaks of genocide in Srebrenica, in order to emphasise the importance of building 
a strong nation as a prevention of any ‘future atrocities.’ The World Bosniak 
Congress, a recently established organisation based in Sarajevo and led by Mustafa 
Cerić, whose primarily political aim is unification and strengthening of Bosniak 
national and cultural identity in BiH, Balkans and diaspora, used exactly the same 
narrative of suffering in its Declaration: “This is the voice of the Pan-Bosniak reason 
that needs to be heard because the Bosniak soul can no longer listen to the crying of 
the innocent child who asks why it had to be killed by those who have no soul at 
all.”75 
One of the aims of the Congress as outlined in the Declaration is to promote 
the truth about Bosniaks sovereign nation and to establish and develop the line of 
defence against all possible threats to Bosniak people.76 The Congress further 
supports development of national institutions, such as the Bosniak Academy of 
Sciences and Arts, and supports international collaboration, through the membership 
of BiH in the Organisation for the Islamic cooperation.77 The Congress also 
recognizes the importance of the Islamic Community for national identity of 
Bosniaks and “will preserve the reputation of Umma”, paying special respect to Reis-
Ul-Ulema.78  
Religion and the Islamic Community in Bosnia, where ethno-confessional 
identity is a basis of political membership, has been important for debates on Bosniak 
national identity and Islamic Community proved as one of the significant political 
agents. The politics that brings all Muslims from the territories of former Yugoslavia 
under the cap of ‘Bosniak’ is possibly the most ambitious political project that Islamic 
Community has supported in the recent history. However it is important to notice 
that this trans-border nation-building expands to other sovereign states in order to 
appeal to a political community of a specific confessional-Islamic-tradition. In that 
respect Islamic Community shows the similar understanding of political membership 
as the neighbouring churches: ethno-confessional belonging is a pre-condition of 
trans-border membership but also a guarantee of a strong political community.  
 
4 Conclusion  
 
In this paper I argued that the issue of identity is at the core of the triadic nexus of 
political community, ethnic belonging and religious affiliation. The question of 
identity has been essential for membership and definitions of who belongs and how. 
Religion and religious institutions have significant influence and impact on the 
concepts of political membership and of the understanding of a polity. Religious 
institutions have been having a similar role and influence on political communities in 
                                                 
75 http://www.sbk.eu.com/dokumenta/constitutive-declaration/.  
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid.  
78 Ibid.  
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three different contexts in which the concepts of citizenship have been interpreted as 
multi-ethnic, ethnocentric and civic: religion has been the main indicator of ethnic 
identity and one of the major tools for nation-building. Although both religions that I 
discussed in this paper are nominally universal they have been reduced in this 
context to ethnic.  
Furthermore, religious institutions have been a main resource of identitarian 
narratives, whose aim is strengthening the sense of ethno-religious belonging of the 
members of a particular polity. These narratives have been often structured against 
the ‘Other’, or in other words against everyone who do not belong to a particular 
ethno-religious group. The ethno-religious narratives have been symbolically 
embedded in the state and political symbols and rituals. In that sense religion and 
religious nationalism (ethnophyletism) have been a source of ethno-centrism, both on 
state and sub-state levels and a political agent that defines the criteria of who can be 
a member in an ethno-national community.  
I argued that by supporting the formation of ‘ethno-confessional polities’ 
religious institutions have replaced universalism with ethnic nationalism that spills 
over the new borders and frequently aims to redefine polities and demos in the new 
successor states. This is the issue that is directly linked to citizenship and that has 
played a part in shaping some of the citizenship regimes. For instance, in the 
Montenegrin case, the issue of dual citizenship has been used to counteract the 
tendencies of the Serbian Orthodox Church and Serbian political elites to influence 
and shape the identity of the political community in Montenegro – as a consequence 
dual citizenship is not tolerated.  
We can find a number of similarities between the different religious 
communities who de facto appeal to members of the other state (in the Serbian case, 
Kosovo) as to the members of their own political community. Although religious 
communities have not been limited to state/national boundaries, their appeal to 
members of the other state is not of religious character but directed towards 
strengthening of ethno-national identity, which consequently may create an 
alienation from the state to which a member officially belongs. As I stressed before, it 
is the triadic nexus of political community, ethnic belonging and religious affiliation 
that enables constitutional nationalism in otherwise secular (and not religious) 
constitutions and states. 
Blending of ethnicity and religiosity is present in elements of citizenship laws, 
and moreover in the definitions of membership to the ethnic nation that owns the 
state and creates these citizenship laws: it denies practically and politically equal 
political membership to those outside the core ethnic groups, which in the 1990s had 
forms of open discrimination, while today it is an implicit discrimination resulting in 
diminishing of political rights and participation.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
